Will the “Bush Doctrine” Survive Its Progenitor? An Assessment of Jus ad Bellum Norms for the Post-Westphallan Age by Westra, Christian
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 The Pen, the Sword, and the Waterboard:
Ethical Lawyering in the “Global War on Terroism”
Article 14
5-1-2009
Will the “Bush Doctrine” Survive Its Progenitor?
An Assessment of Jus ad Bellum Norms for the
Post-Westphallan Age
Christian Westra
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christian Westra, Will the “Bush Doctrine” Survive Its Progenitor? An Assessment of Jus ad Bellum Norms
for the Post-Westphallan Age , 32 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 399 (2009),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol32/iss2/14
WILL THE “BUSH DOCTRINE” SURVIVE ITS 
PROGENITOR? AN ASSESSMENT OF JUS AD 
BELLUM NORMS FOR THE POST-
WESTPHALIAN AGE 
Christian J. Westra*
Abstract: The election of President Barack Obama has generated enor-
mous goodwill abroad. Many have come to anticipate a sharp departure 
from the foreign policy of President George W. Bush. There is no ques-
tion that President Obama has broken with his predecessor in important 
ways, especially in terms of his emphasis on multilateralism and strategic 
dialogue. Nevertheless, he is unlikely to jettison two core principles asso-
ciated with what has become known as the Bush Doctrine: state responsi-
bility and anticipatory self-defense. This Note asks whether there is sup-
port for these principles under customary international law. It concludes 
that there is, and that the use of force provisions in the United Nations 
Charter—at least as originally interpreted in 1945—no longer accurately 
reflect international legal norms on the use of military force. 
Introduction 
 “No president should ever hesitate to use force—unilaterally if 
necessary—to protect ourselves and our vital interests when we are at-
tacked or imminently threatened.”1 Thus declared a leading candidate 
for the presidency of the United States in his first major foreign policy 
address.2 To “constrain rogue nations” and “penetrate terrorist net-
works,” he suggested, requires a “new conception of our national secu-
rity,” one better suited to address the “threats we face at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century.”3 The candidate? Senator Barack Obama.4
                                                                                                                      
* Christian Westra is Executive Note Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review and a joint degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplo-
macy.  The author would like to thank his wife, Sophie, for her encouragement and inspi-
ration. 
1 Press Release, Barack Obama, Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago 
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 History has yet to judge the legacy of President George W. Bush’s 
foreign policy, but it is unlikely to be kind. In the years following Presi-
dent Bush’s first inauguration, the image of the United States became 
tarnished across much of the globe.5 Whatever goodwill the United 
States enjoyed following the attacks of September 11, 2001 was largely 
squandered by the invasion of Iraq.6 Domestically, the Bush administra-
tion’s once stratospheric approval numbers plummeted to historic 
lows.7 In the modern polling era, no other president has gone without 
majority approval for a longer period of time.8
 Of course, history is not written by pundits and pollsters. As Bush 
himself has noted, President Harry S. Truman is recognized today for 
the sagacity of his foreign policy, even though he polled abysmally 
throughout the late 1940s.9 Yet, despite a number of unheralded suc-
cesses,10 the foreign policy of the Bush administration is unlikely to un-
dergo a comparable rehabilitation.11 The specters of Guantànamo and 
Abu Ghraib will not be vanquished so easily.12 It is therefore all the 
more remarkable that since winning the White House, President O-
bama has refrained from rejecting two central tenets of what has be-
come known as the “Bush Doctrine”: the principles of state responsibil-
ity and anticipatory self-defense.13
                                                                                                                      
 
5 See Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006), http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/ 
252.pdf (illustrating, for example, that favorable opinions of the United States fell between 
2002 and 2006 from 61% to 30% in Indonesia, from 30% to 12% in Turkey and from 61% 
to 37% in Germany). 
6 See id. 
7 See Poll: Bush’s Popularity Hits New Low, CNN, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2008/POLITICS/03/19/bush.poll/index.html. 
8 See Gary Langer, Poll: A New Low in Approval Starts Bush’s Final Year, ABC News, Jan. 
15, 2008, http://i.abcnews.com/PollingUnit/Vote2008/story?id=4133095&page=1 (noting 
only three post-World War II presidents have ever had lower approval ratings—Jimmy 
Carter (28 percent), Richard Nixon (24 percent) and Harry Truman (22 percent)). 
9 Kate Zernike, Bush’s Legacy vs. the 2008 Election, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2008, at 44. 
10 Perhaps most notable among them is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), which has distributed life-saving medication to around 1.4 million AIDS patients in 
the developing world. See Joseph Loconte, Bush’s Other War, Wkly. Standard, Jan. 30, 2008, 
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/668cbrke. 
.asp. 
11 See U.S. Held Youngsters at Abu Ghraib, BBC News, March 11, 2005, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/americas/4339511.stm, (highlighting implications of the Abu Ghraib scan-
dal). 
12 See id. 
13 During the 2008 election, Hilary Clinton and John McCain also embraced the prin-
ciples of state responsibility and anticipatory self-defense. As Matthew Yglesias noted in a 
December 2007 editorial, Lee Feinstein, Clinton’s top campaign national security staffer, 
wrote that “the biggest problem with the Bush preemption strategy may be that it does not 
go far enough.” Matthew Yglesias, Beyond Preemption, L.A. Times, Dec. 8, 2007, at A3. Sena-
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 Why is this? The answer has much to do with pragmatism, given 
the novel threat posed by non-state actors, such as terrorists14 and 
transnational criminal groups.15 Nevertheless, jus ad bellum, the law 
governing when it is permissible to make war, also holds explanatory 
value.16 Even though there is little support for the sort of “preventative 
warfare” epitomized by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, other elements of the 
Bush Doctrine are compatible with modern customary international 
law.17 Indeed, certain aspects of the Bush Doctrine better approximate 
the modern jus ad bellum than do the use of force provisions in the 
United Nations Charter (the Charter).18
 This Note begins in Part I by defining the Bush Doctrine. Part II 
continues by discussing how the Bush Doctrine conflicts with the use of 
force provisions in the Charter, specifically articles 2(4), 39 and 51. It 
goes on to argue that this is not dispositive on the question of whether 
the Bush Doctrine is legal under international law because the original 
meaning of the Charter no longer necessarily represents the law of war. 
Part III departs from the U.N. framework to analyze the principles of 
state responsibility and anticipatory self-defense under the lens of cus-
tomary international law. Ultimately, the Note concludes that these 
principles do have some basis in customary international law, even if 
preventative warfare—an extreme form of anticipatory self-defense— 
does not. 
                                                                                                                      
tor McCain, moreover, supported the Iraq War from its inception and “joked” about the 
prospect of bombing Iran, given its role in “training extremists.” Emily Sherman, McCain 
Warns of Increasing Iranian Influence, CNN, Mar. 18, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/ 
POLITICS/03/18/mccain.comments/index.html. 
14 This note defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear 
through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” Bruce Hoff-
man, Defining Terrorism, Terrorism and Counterterrorism 23 (Russell D. Howard & 
Reid L. Sawyer, eds., 2006). 
15 See Press Release, White House, President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West 
Point ( June 1, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601–3. 
html [hereinafter Graduation Speech at West Point]. 
16 Jus ad bellum is to be contrasted with jus in bello, the law of how war ought to be con-
ducted once it has actually commenced. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 21–22 
(1977). 
17 See id. 
18 See Charter of the United Nations, arts. 2(4), 39 & 51 [hereinafter U.N. Charter]. 
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I. Background 
 Defining ideological movements in their infancy presents obvious 
challenges.19 History has a way of congealing slowly into recognizable 
norms.20 It took thirty years for the Monroe Doctrine to enter parlance 
and assume its present meaning.21 If the past is any guide, what is de-
scribed today as the Bush Doctrine may mean something quite differ-
ent years from now.22 Nevertheless, endeavoring to define the term is 
not an altogether feckless enterprise.23 Commentators began referring 
to a “Bush Doctrine” shortly after the attacks of September 11th, 
2001.24 Over time, the term has been used in reference to three princi-
ples: state responsibility, anticipatory self-defense and the so-called 
“freedom agenda.”25
 The first of these principles to be articulated by President Bush 
was the principle of state responsibility, the notion that a state should 
be held liable for whatever happens within its borders.26 Addressing a 
joint session of Congress just a little over a week after September 11th, 
President Bush issued an ultimatum to the world: 
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From 
this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Monroe Doctrine, Columbia Encyclopedia, 2007, http://www.encyclopedia.com/ 
doc/1E1-MonroeDo.html. 
20 See id. 
21 Id. (noting that although President James Monroe called for an end to European in-
terventionism in the Americas during a speech to Congress in 1823, the term, “Monroe 
Doctrine” did not come into use until the 1850s). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 As early as September 13, 2001, reference was made to a “Bush Doctrine on combat-
ing global terrorism.” See Proper Response—War on Terrorism Will Be Long and Involved, Hous-
ton Chron., Sept. 13, 2001, at A24. 
25 Some commentators have seen the Bush Doctrine as analogous to the principle of 
anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., Ivo H. Daalder, Policy Implications of the Bush Doctrine on 
Preemption, Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 16, 2002, http://www.cfr.org/publica- 
tion.html?id=5251. Others believe it also encompasses the doctrine of state responsibility. 
See Eyal Benvenisti, The U.S. and the Use of Force: Double-Edged Hegemony and the Management of 
Global Emergencies, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 677, 691 (2004). Still others highlight the promotion 
of democratic reform abroad as the core element of the Bush Doctrine. See Charles Krau-
thammer, Three Cheers for the Bush Doctrine, Time, Mar. 7, 2005, at 28. 
26 See Press Release, White House, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People (Sept. 20, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09 
/20010920–8.html [hereinafter Address to Joint Session of Congress]. 
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support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a 
hostile regime.27
With its implicit sanction of self-help, the Bush administration’s state 
responsibility principle represented a sharp departure from the law 
enforcement paradigm that had previously characterized U.S. foreign 
policy.28 Notably, the president made no distinction between states 
that actively choose to support terrorists and states that lack control 
over their territory and are therefore incapable of barring terrorists 
from using their land as sanctuary.29
 Next came anticipatory self-defense, the principle that a nation is 
permitted to use force as a means of preempting attack.30 Speaking to 
a graduating class of West Point cadets in June 2002, President Bush 
declared, “our security will require all Americans . . . to be ready for 
preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to de-
fend our lives.”31 As he explained: 
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads 
of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical 
and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic mis-
sile technology . . . occurs, even weak states and small groups 
could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.32
Although it outlined a clear rationale for anticipatory self-defense, 
President Bush’s West Point address did not specify when preemptive 
action is permissible, let alone what form it should take when exer-
cised.33 These questions remained unanswered in the 2002 National 
Security Statement, which formally incorporated the principles of 
state responsibility and anticipatory self-defense as a matter of U.S. 
policy.34
                                                                                                                      
27 See id. 
28 See generally Michael J. Glennon, Forging a Third Way to Fight: Bush Doctrine for Combat-
ing Terrorism Straddles Divide Between Crime and War, 24 Legal Times 38 (2001) (noting that 
when states were historically held “liable for injurious activities carried out by individuals 
within their territory,” the appropriate remedy was indemnification or sanctions, not self-
help). 
29 See Address to Joint Session of Congress, supra note 26. 




34 See The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf [hereinafter National Security Strategy]. 
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 The final principle that some commentators have associated with 
the Bush Doctrine is the so-called “freedom agenda,” the concept that 
U.S. security is enhanced by promoting democratic reform abroad.35 
Drawing from Kant and Wilson, the freedom agenda is essentially a 
variation on the democratic peace theory, which posits that liberal 
democracies do not go to war with one another.36 While it found voice 
in the 2002 National Security Statement,37 the freedom agenda was 
most clearly expressed three years later when President Bush said in 
his second inaugural address: 
The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on 
the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace 
in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.38
Putting aside the empirical matter of whether promoting democracy 
abroad actually does enhance U.S. security, such statements leave un-
answered important questions, not least of all whether the freedom 
agenda should be applied to erstwhile allies.39
 So how ought we to define the Bush Doctrine? Insofar as it repre-
sents a jus ad bellum norm, the Bush Doctrine stands for the proposition 
that the United States treats harboring terrorists, whether deliberately 
or not, as a just cause of war, and reserves the right to use preemptive 
force in self-defense.40 As noted above, such vague dictates leave fun-
damental questions unresolved.41 The freedom agenda has played an 
important rhetorical role in the Bush administration’s foreign policy, 
but it is less directly tied to the law of war.42 Although the freedom 
agenda was mustered as an ex post justification for the Iraq invasion, it 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Kim Holmes, Ensuring a Legacy: Solidifying the Bush Doctrine, Heritage Found. 
(2007), http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed011707b.cfm. 
36 See Thomas S. Szayna et al, Rand Corporation, The Emergence of Peer Com-
petitors: A Framework for Analysis, 147–49 (2001), https://rand.org/pubs/mono- 
graph_reports/MR1346/MR1346.appc.pdf. 
37 See National Security Strategy, supra note 34, at 21–23. 
38 Press Release, White House, President Sworn-In to Second Term ( Jan. 20, 2005), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120–1.html [hereinafter Sec-
ond Inaugural]. 
39 Jackson Diehl, Retreat From the Freedom Agenda, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 2006, at A17 
(noting incompatibility between Freedom Agenda and U.S. energy and security objectives 
in the Caucasus). 
40 See Address to Joint Session of Congress, supra note 26; Graduation Speech at West 
Point, supra note 15. 
41 See Address to Joint Session of Congress, supra note 26; Graduation Speech at West 
Point, supra note 15. 
42 See Second Inaugural, supra note 38. 
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was never the primary rationale for invading Afghanistan or Iraq.43 
Therefore, it is best tabled in an inquiry as to whether the Bush Doc-
trine is consistent with international law on the use of force.44
II. Discussion 
 Assuming the Bush Doctrine stands for the principles of state re-
sponsibility and anticipatory self-defense, does it violate international 
law? There can be little question that the Bush Doctrine violates the 
text of the U.N. Charter.45 Underpinning the Charter are the twin but-
tresses of state sovereignty and sovereign equality.46 Article 2(7) pre-
cludes the U.N. from intervening in “matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”47 This sentiment is ech-
oed in the Charter’s use of force provisions.48 Article 2(4) stipulates 
that member states “shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state.”49 There are only two exceptions.50 First, 
when the U.N. Security Council ascertains the “existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” it may sanction 
the use of force under article 39.51 Second, under article 51, U.N. 
member states are permitted to use force in “individual or collective 
self-defense” if an “armed attack” has been launched against them.52
 Neither of these exceptions appears to accommodate the Bush 
Doctrine.53 Article 39 is inapplicable because state responsibility and 
anticipatory self-defense are implicitly principles of self-help.54 As 
President Bush put it succinctly in his 2004 State of the Union address, 
“America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation, CNN, Feb. 6, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript [hereinafter Powell U.N. Presentation]. 
44 See id. 
45 See U.N. Charter, arts. 39 & 51. 
46 See id. art. 2(7). 
47 Id. 
48 See id. arts. 39 & 51. 
49 Id. art. 2(4). 
50 See id. arts. 39 & 51. 
51 Id. art. 39. 
52 Id. art. 51 (stipulating that states are permitted to use force in self-defense but only 
“until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security”). 
53 See id. arts. 39 & 51. 
54 See Press Release, White House, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120–7.html. 
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country.”55 At first blush, article 51 seems more promising.56 One 
might argue, for example, that the term “armed attack” could be con-
strued broadly to include imminent attacks or the provision of sanctu-
ary to non-state armed groups operating within a given country.57 Nev-
ertheless, this line of reasoning is almost certainly inconsistent with the 
intent of the Charter’s drafters.58 Moreover, it has been effectively 
sealed off by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).59 In Nicaragua v. 
United States 60 the ICJ held that for purposes of article 51, an “armed 
attack” refers only to an actual large-scale invasion or bombardment 
directed by a state.61 More recently, in its Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion 62 
the ICJ emphasized that article 51 may be invoked only by states that 
are attacked by other states.63
 As a number of observers have noted, the real question is whether 
the use of force provisions in the Charter still represent international 
law.64 The answer to this question, in turn, hinges on how one inter-
prets the Charter.65 Borrowing from U.S. constitutional jurisprudence 
it is possible to identify two broad approaches: originalism and adaptiv-
ism.66 Under the originalist school of thought, the Charter is a static 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 See U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
57 See Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit, 99 
Am. J. Int’l L. 62, 64–65. 
58 See Michael J. Glennon, Idealism at the U.N., Pol’y Rev., Feb. & March 2005, 8–12 
(noting scholars such as Thomas Franck, Louis Henkin and Ian Brownlie have argued that 
the drafters of article 51 meant to bar anticipatory self-defense, including self-help meas-
ures pursuant to the state responsibility principle). 
59 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 231 ( June 
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. United States]; see also Legal Consequences of the Construc-
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 
¶ 128 ( July 9) [hereinafter Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion]. 
60 See Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 231 (noting that neither “incursions, 
nor the alleged supply of arms” is enough to justify the exercise of collective self-defense 
under article 51). 
61 See id; see also Murphy, supra note 57, at 65 (noting that under the jurisprudence of 
the Nicaragua court, “if a state simply provides weapons or logistical support to a non-state 
actor, which in turn uses force against a second state, such action does not constitute an 
‘armed attack’ by the first state within the meaning of Article 51”). 
62 See Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 128. 
63 See Murphy, supra note 57, at 65. 
64 See Glennon, supra note 58, at 3–14 (questioning whether the Charter is suited to 
address modern-day security challenges). But cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell, American So-
ciety of Int’l Law, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense (2002), http://www.asil. 
org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (arguing that the use of force provisions in the Charter are 
still relevant and continue to represent international law). 
65 See Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power 101–02 (2001). 
66 See id. 
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treaty.67 By ratifying the Charter, each member state consents to be 
bound by its use of force provisions, as these provisions were inter-
preted by the original drafters in 1945.68 Changes in historical circum-
stance have no effect on this obligation.69 To suggest otherwise by 
maintaining that the Charter is some sort of “living document” imposes 
an entirely new set of obligations upon signatory states.70 Doing so, 
originalists underscore, is fundamentally inconsistent with a voluntarist 
legal regime in which states are bound only insofar as they consent to 
be bound.71
 Originalists can be divided further into two camps: formal textual-
ists and legal realists.72 Formal textualists limit any jus ad bellum inquiry 
to the text of the Charter and maintain that military action taken out-
side of the Charter is ultra vires and per se illegal.73 By contrast, legal re-
alists argue that the use of force provisions of the Charter have fallen 
into desuetude, meaning that they no longer have binding legal 
force.74 Legal realists agree with formal textualists that the Charter 
must be read according to the intent of its drafters.75 Nevertheless, they 
posit that contrary state practice has rendered the Charter’s use of 
force provisions effectively meaningless.76 Legal realists point to the 
fact that despite article 2(4)’s categorical proscription on the use of 
force, states have used force against one another on hundreds of occa-
sions since the Charter’s inception.77 Moreover, when force has been 
used, it has rarely been used under the auspices of article 39 or 51.78 
What matters most to legal realists is not what states have formally con-
                                                                                                                      
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 63. 
69 See id. 
70 See Glennon, supra note 65, at 63. 
71 In 1927 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) set forth what has sub-
sequently become known as the “freedom principle.” As explained by the Court: “[t]he 
rules of law binding upon states . . . emanate from their own free will as expressed in con-
ventions . . . . [R]estrictions upon the independence of states therefore cannot be pre-
sumed.” Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 
7), quoted in Glennon, supra note 65, at 63. 
72 See Glennon, supra note 65, at 101–02 (Professor Glennon does not draw this dis-
tinction explicitly, although it is suggested by his analysis). 
73 See id. at 101. 
74 See id. at 60–64 (noting that “[t]he idea traces to Roman law, which recognized that 
a statute could be rendered void by lack of enforcement over a given period”). 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 Glennon, supra note 58, at 8 (noting that between 1945 and 1989 states used armed 
force between 200–680 times). 
78 See id. 
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sented to but how they actually behave.79 At its essence, the legal realist 
jus ad bellum conception is predicated on the notion that there can be 
no law without compliance.80 In other words, law is coercive, not aspira-
tional.81
 Unlike originalists, adaptivists begin with the premise that the 
Charter is no ordinary treaty.82 Although treaties typically bind states 
only to the extent they consent to be bound, the Charter gave birth to 
the world’s preeminent international organization.83 As such, adaptiv-
ists argue, it is a constitutive document which should be interpreted to 
meet the challenges of each new age.84 Adaptivists emphasize that the 
drafters of the Charter lived in a world very different from our own.85 
Emerging from the rubble of the Second World War, their overriding 
concern was to avoid the mistakes of Versailles and restrain the nations 
of the world from ever going to war with each other again.86 Today, the 
security landscape is dramatically different.87 Enabled by advances in 
weapons and communications technology, non-state armed groups— 
from heroin traffickers to Islamic jihadists—exert power across state 
borders in a way hitherto unimaginable.88 Adaptavists believe that the 
Charter’s use of force provisions should be read to address these new 
threats, even if doing so departs sharply from the original intentions of 
the drafters.89
 Which is the correct interpretative method? As in the U.S. domes-
tic sphere, the answer is not easily settled.90 Originalism resonates 
strongly as a form of treaty interpretation, but adaptivists reject the no-
tion that the Charter is a conventional treaty.91 Thus, even if original-
ism is correct as a matter of conventional treaty interpretation, that 
would hardly be dispositive.92 Instead of asking which interpretive 
                                                                                                                      
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See Glennon, supra note 65, at 101–02. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, Foreign Affairs, 
Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 99–110 (adopting one adaptivist position vis-à-vis the Charter’s use of 
force provisions); see also Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force 45–52 (2002) (illustrat-
ing the original motivations of the Charter drafters in 1945). 
86 See Franck, supra note 85, at 45–52. 
87 See Graduation Speech at West Point, supra note 15. 
88 See id. 
89 See Glennon, supra note 65, at 101–02. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
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method is correct, one might instead consider the implications of fol-
lowing each approach.93 In so doing, it is instructive to examine one 
earlier challenge to the Charter’s legitimacy: the 1999 North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Kosovo.94
 Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United States took part in a 
number of peacekeeping missions abroad.95 Although the Security 
Council backed several of these humanitarian interventions, it re-
frained from doing so in Kosovo, even as reports spread of mounting 
human rights atrocities across the region.96 On March 24, 1999, the 
United States and its NATO allies commenced operations against Yugo-
slavia without U.N. authorization.97 Over the course of its eleven-week 
campaign, NATO flew 38,000 sorties against Serb positions throughout 
Yugoslavia.98 Russia and China, which had previously resisted any Secu-
rity Council authorization for the use of force, adopted a strict textual-
ist position and condemned the operation as a gross violation of inter-
national law.99 Many Western observers demurred.100 As one report for 
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded, the 
operation may have been “illegal” under the Charter but it was still “le-
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. 
94 See Interventions After the Cold War, Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., http://www. 
idrc.ca/en/ev-62203–201–1-DO_TOPIC.html [hereinafter Interventions after the Cold 
War] (providing a succinct overview of NATO’s 1999 campaign in Kosovo). 
95 See generally Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the 
Post-Cold War World (2000) (offering the preeminent survey of humanitarian inter-
ventionism in the 1990s). 
96 See id. at 55–61, 103–07 (describing U.N. authorization for the U.S.-led interventions 
in Somalia and Haiti); see also Interventions after the Cold War, supra note 94. 
97 Interventions After the Cold War, supra note 94. 
98 NATO Rejects Mole Allegations, BBC News, March 9, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/europe/671377.stm. 
99 On March 24, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister stated, “[t]he Chinese Govern-
ment opposes the use of force or the threat of the use of force in international affairs, and 
opposes interference in other nations’ internal affairs no matter what the excuse or by 
what means, and opposes any random action that circumvents the U.N. Security Council.” 
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gitimate.”101 The Charter, in other words, had either fallen into desue-
tude or evolved to permit the sort of military action its drafters had 
sought to proscribe.102
 The response to the Kosovo crisis from legal realists and adaptivists 
is open to criticism.103 Legal realists argue that NATO was free to inter-
vene in Kosovo because the Charter’s use of force provisions had fallen 
into desuetude and no longer represented international law.104 In mak-
ing this argument, however, they undermine the legitimacy of the Se-
curity Council and offer no remedy for U.N. reform short of amending 
the Charter or replacing it altogether—an entirely unrealistic proposi-
tion.105 Institutionalists who believe that the U.N. has an important role 
in international security cannot but find this unpalatable.106 Adaptivists, 
in turn, argue that a new “responsibility to protect” has emerged to jus-
tify humanitarian interventionism, consistent with the Charter.107 Adap-
tivists maintain that even without Security Council approval, NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo was justified under a broader responsibility to 
protect because sovereignty is no longer absolute but “contingent” 
upon humane governance.108 Of course, the problem with this sort of 
consequentialist reasoning is that it conflicts sharply with the intent of 
the drafters, not to mention the views of many current U.N. member 
states.109
 Despite the drawbacks of legal realism and adaptivism, formal tex-
tualism is much less suited to address the security challenges of the 
modern age, an age in which the greatest threat to peace is intrastate 
conflict rather than warfare between states.110 As the Kosovo crisis re-
veals, formal textualism may offer consistency and predictability as an 
interpretive approach, yet it also holds the possibility of yielding nor-
matively repugnant results.111 This is particularly evident in regard to 
the paradigm of state sovereignty.112 Although originally devised as a 
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bulwark against interstate aggression, article 2(7) was invoked during 
the Kosovo crisis to shield the Milosevic regime as it committed atroci-
ties against its own people.113 Even if there is “no question that Russia 
and China were correct in arguing that NATO’s bombing violated the 
Charter,” it is difficult to accept that NATO should have stood by in the 
face of a mounting humanitarian catastrophe.114 Likewise, it is hard to 
argue that the world community should not have taken action to stop 
genocide in Rwanda or Darfur, even if doing so would have violated the 
Charter’s use of force provisions.115
 There are clear parallels between humanitarian interventionism 
and the Bush Doctrine, at least in terms of their permissibility under 
the Charter.116 Like humanitarian interventionism, the principles of 
state responsibility and anticipatory self-defense are precluded by a 
formal textualist’s reading of the Charter, but not by the reading of a 
legal realist or an adaptavist.117 Put somewhat differently, if the Char-
ter’s use of force provisions—as originally interpreted by the draft-
ers—represent international law, the Bush Doctrine is clearly ille-
gal.118 Nevertheless, if they no longer represent international law or if 
their meaning has somehow evolved to accommodate other jus ad bel-
lum norms, elements of the Bush Doctrine may well be legal.119 As-
suming this is true, any inquiry into the legality of the Bush Doctrine 
under international law would proceed outside the text of the Char-
ter.120
III. Analysis 
 If the original meaning of the Charter no longer governs the doc-
trine of just war, what takes its place?121 One possibility is that nothing 
does.122 Outside of enforceable treaty obligations, generalized legal 
norms may simply have no place in the international security arena.123 
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Judge Rosalyn Higgins alluded to this prospect before assailing it in her 
dissent to the ICJ’s 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.124 Like 
Ronald Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules,” Higgins suggested that there are 
no non-liquets,125 or gaps, in international law regarding the use of 
force.126 Rather than defer judgment on the legality of using or threat-
ening to use nuclear weapons, Higgins argued that the ICJ should have 
expounded a legal norm, thereby confirming its existence and viabil-
ity.127 If Higgins is mistaken and the international security arena is 
characterized largely by a non-liquet, the freedom principle would per-
mit states to apply the principles of state responsibility and anticipatory 
self-defense at will, barring any enforceable treaty obligations to the 
contrary.128 If, on the other hand, international law still has some func-
tion in determining whether a particular conflict is justified, custom 
would play an important interstitial role.129
 In the international context, custom is defined as “a general and 
considered practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal ob-
ligation,” or what is commonly referred to as opinio juris.130 Tradition-
ally, practice and opinio juris have been accorded equal weight in ascer-
taining custom.131 The theory is that law cannot simply mirror state 
practice; to be law it must have some independent coercive force be-
cause it is law.132 Discerning opinio juris, however, raises a significant 
causation problem.133 How can one possibly know that a state is acting 
in a certain way from a sense of legal obligation?134 How does one iso-
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late other possible motivations, most importantly, self-interest?135 Revi-
sionists maintain that practice should be weighted more heavily than 
opinio juris because it is far easier to measure and much less open to 
subjective interpretation.136 Given that there is little clear evidence of 
opinio juris regarding the principles of state responsibility or anticipa-
tory self-defense, this seems a prudent approach in analyzing the legal-
ity of the Bush Doctrine under customary international law.137
 Before delving into the intricacies of custom, it is worth noting a 
few general principles that have traditionally colored popular just war 
conceptions.138 While there is no formal lexicon of customary jus ad 
bellum principles, Augustine’s City of God is a logical starting point.139 
The notion of “righteous war” discussed in City of God finds its source in 
natural law, namely the law of Christian morality.140 Fundamentally, 
Augustine believed that war must be “undertaken in obedience to 
God.”141 A “man,” he wrote, “[is] blameless who carries on war on the 
authority of God.”142 As a product of early medieval thought, City of God 
is hardly a workable guide for confronting modern-day security chal-
lenges.143 Even so, it has, over the ages, inspired criteria for judging the 
legitimacy of military action that continue to have resonance today.144 
Just wars, for example, are widely understood to be proportionate in 
their ends and undertaken only as a last resort, after all other possible 
recourses have been exhausted.145 A strict positivist would dismiss any 
precepts predicated on natural law—whether ordained by God or oth-
erwise manifested—as “nonsense upon stilts.”146 At the same time, this 
does not preclude what is perceived to be just from having expressive 
power.147
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A. State Responsibility 
 As a general principle of customary international law, a state is not 
permitted to use its territory in a way that causes harm beyond its bor-
ders.148 International environmental law has long encapsulated this 
principle, as exemplified by the landmark Trail Smelter Arbitration be-
tween the United States and Canada (1928–1931, 1935–1941).149 For 
years, the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Trail, British 
Columbia emitted great clouds of sulfur dioxide southward into Wash-
ington’s Columbia River Valley, causing agricultural damage and dimin-
ishing air quality for local inhabitants.150 The U.S. government ob-
jected and eventually an arbitral tribunal was assembled to consider the 
matter.151 Over a series of deliberations, the tribunal determined that 
the Canadian government should pay damages to the United States 
and limit future sulfur omissions from the Trail smelter.152 In so doing, 
it reasoned that a state bears responsibility for pollution that spreads 
beyond its borders.153
 There are clear parallels to the Trail Smelter Arbitration in the secu-
rity context.154 One of the earliest cases brought before the ICJ was the 
Corfu Channel Case.155 On October 22, 1946, four British warships en-
tered Albanian waters.156 As one of the warships made its way up the 
Corfu Straight, a violent explosion ripped across its hull.157 A second 
warship steamed towards the fiery hulk, only to hit another mine.158 In 
all, forty-four British sailors died.159 Although the mines had actually 
been laid by Germany during World War II, the ICJ concluded that 
“Albania [was] responsible under international law for the explo-
sions.”160 In arriving at its decision, the Court pointed to the fact that 
“nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the dis-
aster.”161 Moreover, even if the mines had been German, “the laying of 
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the minefield . . . could not have been accomplished without the 
knowledge of the Albanian Government.”162 Every state, the Court em-
phasized, has an “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”163
 Taken together, the Trail Smelter Arbitration and the Corfu Channel 
Case affirm the general proposition that a state has responsibility for 
preventing what transpires on its territory from adversely impacting 
other states.164 Of course, many questions are unresolved at this rare-
fied level of abstraction.165 In both the Trail Smelter Arbitration and the 
Corfu Channel Case, the principal remedy was monetary damages.166 Are 
there instances in which monetary damages would not offer adequate 
restitution?167 Canada was also required to limit its sulfur dioxide emis-
sions, but what if it had been incapable of doing so?168 Should poorer 
countries be compelled to allocate resources for the protection of for-
eigners when such resources could otherwise be used to provide their 
own people with basic necessities?169 Finally, what if there is not enough 
time to refer a breach of state responsibility to an arbitral tribunal or 
the ICJ?170 Is a state ever entitled to act unilaterally?171
 The Bush Doctrine offers some answers to these questions.172 Al-
though it starts from the same general proposition that states are re-
sponsible for what transpires within their borders, the Bush Doctrine 
departs significantly from the approach taken in the Trail Smelter Arbi-
tration and the Corfu Channel Case.173 Monetary damages are not con-
templated under the Bush Doctrine.174 Nor are institutional arbiters 
like the ICJ called upon to adjudicate.175 If a state “harbor[s] or sup-
port[s] terrorism” it is automatically “regarded by the United States as a 
hostile regime.”176 Consequently, any self-help measures deemed to be 
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necessary may be taken.177 The principle of state responsibility envi-
sioned by the Bush Doctrine is essentially a form of strict liability.178 
Regardless of whether they have the resources to police their borders, 
states are held liable for the conduct of those whom they “harbor,” even 
if such individuals are not being harbored by design.179
 Customary international law may support elements of this reformu-
lation.180 Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-coordinated offensive 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan following September 11th, is perhaps 
the most notable recent example of self-help undertaken pursuant to 
the state responsibility doctrine.181 Nevertheless, there are other exam-
ples of supporting state practice.182 The United States used force in 
Libya (1986)183 following an attack on a West German discotheque by 
Libyan militants, and in Afghanistan and the Sudan (1998)184 following 
the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Over 
the past twenty years, Israel has intervened on countless occasions in 
Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories in response to terrorist attacks 
on its civilians.185 And as recently as March 2008, Colombia launched a 
cross-border commando raid against a Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) camp in the jungles of northeastern Ecuador.186
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 Admittedly, many states flatly reject the legality of self-help meas-
ures.187 Even so, the sheer number of times self-help has been exercised 
pursuant to the principle of state responsibility may render this position 
untenable.188 Assuming certain forms of self-help are legitimate under 
international law, what would custom permit?189 One predicate to any 
intervention would presumably be harm suffered by the intervener 
caused by forces operating within or supported by the target country.190 
As a general rule, the more proportionate and less overtly unilateral an 
intervention is, the more legitimacy it would likely be accorded by the 
international community.191 Operation Enduring Freedom, for exam-
ple, was widely accepted, given the gravity of the September 11th at-
tacks and the fact that international institutions like the U.N. and 
NATO had signaled their support prior to the commencement of hos-
tilities.192 By contrast, the U.S. strike on Libya was roundly criticized in 
light of its scale and unilateral character.193
 Another way of contemplating the state responsibility principle is 
to expand the notion of contingent sovereignty.194 Proponents of hu-
manitarian interventionism suggest that traditional concepts of sover-
eignty and sovereign equality originating from the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) and later encapsulated in the U.N. Charter no longer character-
ize the international system.195 Sovereignty, they maintain, is not abso-
lute but rather contingent upon humane governance.196 In much the 
same way, sovereignty might also be said to be contingent upon a coun-
try’s ability to control its own territory.197 States that lack this ability 
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could be described as having forfeited sovereignty over the ungoverned 
spaces within their borders.198 If other states are threatened or attacked 
by non-state actors operating in such areas, they may well be justified in 
taking military action.199
B. Anticipatory Self-Defense 
 The classic case of early anticipatory self-defense involving the 
United States took place long before the inception of the Bush Doc-
trine.200 In 1837 an insurrection raged across parts of British Canada.201 
Suspicions grew that the Caroline, a U.S. steamship, was providing sup-
port to the rebels.202 One late December night, a band of Canadian 
loyalists crossed into New York and boarded the Caroline.203 After killing 
several U.S. nationals, they set fire to the ship and sent it crashing over 
Niagara Falls.204 Condemnation came swiftly from Washington, where 
U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster demanded an apology.205 Al-
though the British were hardly contrite, Webster’s efforts did yield one 
nascent standard for determining the permissibility of anticipatory self-
defense.206
 There are two aspects to Webster’s standard: necessity and pro-
portionality.207 First, Webster argued, for anticipatory self-defense to 
be justified, the “necessity of that self-defense [must be] instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of delib-
eration.”208 Simply suspecting that an attack might soon occur is not 
enough to demonstrate necessity.209 An attack must be imminent and 
there must be no other possible recourse.210 Second, Webster noted, 
an action taken in anticipatory self-defense must be proportionate to 
the threat at hand.211 In other words, to justify the destruction of the 
Caroline: 
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The local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity 
of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the 
United States at all, [must not have taken action that was] un-
reasonable or excessive; since [an] act, justified by the neces-
sity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept 
clearly within it.212
In essence, regardless of whether the attack on the Caroline met the re-
quirement of necessity, its impact still had to have been reasonably cor-
related to the nature of the initial threat.213
 The Bush Doctrine departs significantly from the Caroline stan-
dard.214 In one sense, the Bush Doctrine can be understood to expand 
Webster’s definition of necessity broadly.215 Whereas the Caroline test of 
necessity requires an attack to be imminent before it can be pre-
empted, the Bush Doctrine is significantly more permissive.216 However 
feasible waiting until the “necessity of self-defense is instant [and] 
overwhelming” may have been in the nineteenth century, doing so in 
the twenty-first century, the Bush Doctrine posits, would be naively 
anachronistic.217 After all, non-state armed groups operating at the 
“perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology” have the potential 
to exert tremendous destruction with little or no warning.218 Yet, what 
becomes of the Caroline standard’s proportionality requirement?219 Do 
notions of proportionality fall out of the Bush Doctrine altogether?220
 Another way of understanding the Bush Doctrine is to say that it 
effectively collapses the Caroline standard into a modified form of cost-
benefit analysis.221 Viewed in this light, the necessity of anticipatory self-
defense is determined not by some measure of imminence but rather by 
the risk of taking action measured against the risk of not acting.222 Pro-
portionality is relevant to this calculus insofar as security threats are 
evaluated as a function of two variables: potential impact and probability 
of occurrence.223 What has made the Bush Doctrine so permissive is the 
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heavy weight accorded to the former.224 Indeed, to a large extent, the 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was driven by an emphasis on the poten-
tial impact of Iraq acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
using them, as opposed to the probability of this actually occurring.225
 Customary international law may support some relaxation of the 
Caroline standard.226 Since the end of the Second World War, there 
have been several incidents involving anticipatory self-defense.227 With 
the possible exception of Israel’s preemptive attack on its Arab 
neighbors in 1967, when “[a]n orchestrated Arab assault on Israel 
seemed inevitable,” none of these incidents satisfies the Caroline neces-
sity requirement.228 Moreover, to the extent that opinio juris can be 
gleaned, there is evidence to suggest that states have come to accept a 
somewhat broader interpretation of when anticipatory self-defense is 
permissible.229 At the very least, state practice and opinio juris seem to 
indicate that waiting until an attack is actually in progress is no longer 
required under customary international law.230 Imminence in the 
modern age almost certainly encompasses a somewhat broader time-
frame.231
 This is not to say that custom supports the Bush Doctrine vintage 
of anticipatory self-defense.232 Whether the Bush Doctrine is inter-
preted to expand the Caroline test of necessity or to replace the Caroline 
standard with a modified form of cost-benefit analysis, there is little 
support in international legal custom for the sort of “preventative” war-
fare exemplified by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.233 Ultimately, Iraq 
was invaded to prevent it from developing WMD that it might have 
used or transferred elsewhere.234 In this sense, one analogue to the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq is the 1981 missile strike by Israel on Iraq’s Osirak 
nuclear reactor, which was also roundly condemned by the interna-
tional community.235 Although the impact of the Israeli operation was 
far smaller than the impact of the Iraq War, the overall objective was 
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the same: to prevent a dangerous potentiality from occurring at some 
point later in time.236 Regardless of whether such an objective is strate-
gically prudent, it is clearly inconsistent with the longstanding just war 
notion that war should be undertaken only as a last resort.237
Conclusion 
 The Bush Doctrine is not illegal under international law simply 
because it violates the text of the U.N. Charter. Assessed from the lens 
of adaptivism or legal realism, the Charter’s use of force provisions—at 
least as understood by the original drafters—no longer represent the 
law of war. This is not to say that anything necessarily replaces them. 
The Athenians of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue may well have put it 
best in musing that “the strong do what they will while the weak suffer 
what they must.” Law, in other words, may have no determinative role 
in assessing whether a state should go to war. Perhaps at a fundamental 
level, the decision to make war is no different from any other policy 
decision. 
 Yet, for all of its explanatory power, this approach seems overly 
simplistic. While state interest plays a major role—almost certainly the 
major role—in any decision to make war, it does not automatically fol-
low that law has no meaning or coercive force in the international se-
curity arena. At the very least, what is perceived as being just or legal 
has an expressive power that cannot easily be ignored, and which may 
well aid in predicting state behavior. Visions of natural law contem-
plated by Augustine onwards provide one source of just war principles. 
So too, does custom, as revealed through state practice and, wherever 
discernable, opinio juris. 
 In considering these indicia, it is clear that the principles of state 
responsibility and anticipatory self-defense have some basis in interna-
tional law. The Bush Doctrine, while at once incorporating the two 
principles, also expands upon them dramatically by permitting expan-
sive self-help in the case of the former and by effectively jettisoning the 
concept of necessity in the case of the latter. Modern state practice 
supports elements of this reformulation, particularly as regards the 
state responsibility principle. Nevertheless, there is little support for 
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expanding the principle of anticipatory self-defense to incorporate 
preventative warfare. 
 President Obama is unlikely to invoke the Bush Doctrine by 
name. At the same time, he is almost certain to take a broad reading 
of what is permitted under the principles of state responsibility and 
anticipatory self-defense, even if he flatly rejects the notion of preven-
tative warfare. The U.S. may not always abide by the advice of its allies, 
but the tenor of American diplomacy will undoubtedly change. At its 
most effective, American diplomacy will move away from Manichean 
totems towards a more traditional understanding of when military 
action is just and appropriate. 
